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right of review should be given any member who claims discriminatory ex-
clusion by a union.
In the past, the focussing of attention on secured union's abuses has shifted
opposition from the abuses themselves to union security in general. This
confusion in the popular and legislative mind has so obscured the problem
that discrimination is forgotten in the battle over banning security altogether,
But indefensible as discriminatory union practices may be, they are not elim-
inated by abolishing union security devices which have historically resulted
from the fundamental insecurity of labor's position in the economy. Recog-
nition of union security as a natural and useful product of-and aid to-the
collective bargaining relationship would disperse confusion and clear the way
for direct action on the real problem-union discrimination in admission, ex-
clusion and expulsion.
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DEDUCTIBILITY OF PENALTY PAYMENTS AS BUSINESS
EXPENSES.
IN deducting "ordinary and necessary" business expenses from his gross
income,' the taxpayer may include any damages paid to private parties for
violations of a statute.2 He has not been permitted, however, to deduct pen-
remedies within the union he may appeal to the State Labor Relations Commission which
will conduct hearings to determine whether the individual was unfairly denied admission
to membership or whether the discipline was violative of the union by-laws or constitution,
was imposed without fair hearing, was not warranted, or is not in accord with public
policy. Upon finding for the individual the Board issues an order to the union to admit
him, and if the union refuses, the Board issues an order to cease and desist efforts aimed
at securing the employee's discharge.
As to the effectiveness of this legislative scheme, see Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory
Regulation of Intenmal Unioa Affairs-I, 44 ILT. L. Rav. 425, 455 (1949).
M ember of the second-year class, Yale Law School.
* Rossman v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
1. "In computing net income there shall he allowed as deductions all the ordinary
and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business... ! Ix. Rav. COD §23(a) (1).
2. Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935) (allowing deduction of
damages paid in a fraud action) : 'Ve cannot agree that private wrongdoing in the course
of business is extraordinary within the meaning of the tadng statute allowing deductions
for 'ordinary and necessary expenses. The statute itself makes no such exception, apd
since it is construable as we have interpreted it, that construction against the collector is
required by the long established rule of interpretation of the statute." Id. at 360.
No distinction is made between damages paid to private complainants in common
law actions and those paid to them under regulatory statutes. International Shoe Co.,
38 B.T.A, 81 (1938), acq., 1938-2 Cums. BuLL 17 (conspiracy in restraint of trade);
Huff, Andrews, & Thomas, 1 B.T.A. 542 (1925) (payment to Red Cross and other
chprties for violation of Food Control Act) ; I.T. 3627, 1943 Cu. BULL. Il (treble
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alties paid to government agencies.3 Courts have felt that the effect of a
penalty would be watered down by the prospect of partial recovery through
a tax saving.4 The contrasting treatment in effect assumes that while private
damages rarely contribute to law enforcement, public penalties almost always
damages paid to customers under Emergency Price Control Act) ; I.T. 3762, 1945 Cum.
BULL. 95 (double damages under Fair Labor Standards Act) ; I.T. 3412, 1940-2 Cum.
BuLu. 174 (awards to employees under the National Labor Relations Act).
3. Federal statutes: e.g., Helvering v. Superior Wines and Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d
373 (8th Cir. 1937) (liquor regulations) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d
372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930) (Safety Appliance Act, and similar
acts); Scioto Provision Co., 9 T.C. 439 (1947) (Price Control Act) ; Bonnie Bros., Inc.,
15 "B.T.A. 1231 (1929) (prohibition law). See also G.C.M. 11358, XII-1 Cum. BULL.
29 (1933) (tax penalties) ; I.T. 1174, 1-1 Cum. Buu. 269 (1922) (antitrust laws).
State statutes: e.g., Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (antitrust laws); Helen B. Achells,
28 B.T.A. 244 (1933) (tax penalties).
Local police regulations: Unpublished Office Decision summarized in 1 C.C.H. 1950
FED. TAx REP. ff 146,322 (regulations such as parking restrictions and building codes).
4. This vague policy was first enunciated in England, where statutory deductions
for business expenses are similarly limited: Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Warnes & Co.,
[1919] 2 K.B. 444. Federal courts have endeavored to rationalize their position by ar-
guing that expenses arising out of violation of laws are not "ordinary," or in any event
are not "necessary," e.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937), or that they are not "proximately caused" by business activity,
cf. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924). But most courts now explicitly state that the
disallowance is based solely on public policy. E.g., United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488
(8th Cir. 1938) aff'd on other grounds sub nora. United States v. Bertelsen & Peterson
Engineering Co., 306 U.S. 276 (1939) ; Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co. v. Commissioner,
47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 852 (1941).
In order to exclude damage payments to private persons under regulatory statutes
from the application of this public policy against diminishing the effect of legal sanc-
tions, the taxing authorities have sometimes relied upon the purely verbal distinction
between "penal" and "remedial" damages. The inconclusiveness of this formal cate-
gorization is demonstrated by the manner in which OPA claimed that treble damages
were penal for some purposes and remedial for others and by the equally inconsistent or
indecisive attitude of the courts on the subject. Compare Bowles v. Farmers Nat. Bank,
147 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1945) (treble damages held penal thus defeating Price Adminis-
trator's claim of survivorship), wvith Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Wis. 1944)
(treble damages held remedial thus defeating claim of privilege against self-incrimination
and defense of double jeopardy) and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state courts
have jurisdiction to enforce treble damages, but the Court sidestepped the question of
whether a treble damage suit involved a federal penalty which would presumably be un-
enforcible in state courts). For extensive survey of the conflicting decisions, see Oglebay,
Provability and Dischargealnity of Judgments against Overcharging Merchants and
Landlords under Einergency Price Control Act, 21 J.N.A. REF. BAi;KR. 39 (1947).
Despite the inutility of this classification, the Internal Revenue Bureau based allow-
ance of deduction of double damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069
(1938), 29 U.S.C. 216(b) (1946), primarily on judicial determinations that these damages
were remedial. I.T. 3762, 1945 Cum. BULL. 95. Since the label remedial has little or no
real significance out of context, the cases relied upon should not have been decisive be-
cause the issues before the courts were entirely unrelated to taxation. Overnight Motor
Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583 n. 24 (1942).
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do. In Rossnumn v. Commissioner,' the second circuit abandoned this ar-
bitrary assumption and permitted the deduction of a penalty paid to OPA
under a compromise settlement.
The Rossman Corporation, a wholesale processor of textile goods, accepted
without scrutiny the erroneous yardage figures of its subcontracting dyer and
consequently overcharged its retail customers. Upon discovery of the mis-
take, the corporation immediately reported the violation to the OPA. The
Administrator accepted tender of the overcharge as full settlement, and the
corporation claimed the item as a deductible expense. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction, and his action was upheld by the
Tax Court.6
Reversing the Tax Court, the second circuit held that an expense arising
out of a violation of a regulatory act is deductible unless such an allowance
would frustrate the "sharply defined" policy of the statute.- The court relied
on Commiss oner v. Heibinger,8 in which the Supreme Court allowed the de-
duction of legal expenses incurred by a taxpayer in his attempt to enjoin en-
forcement of a postal order revoking his mailing privileges. Even though the
revocation order was based on the taxpayer's fraudulent use of the mails, the
Court felt that permitting the deduction for attorney's fees would not frustrate
the statutory policy of protecting the public against mail frauds.0 The court
in the Rossvnan case extended the Heininger rationale to penalties1 ° and held
that to allow the deduction of this overcharge assessment levied under the
5. 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
6. 10 T.C. 468 (1948). Speaking for a bare majority Judge LeMire held that the
court was bound by precedent. In separate dissenting opinions Judges Harlan and Opper
reasoned that there was no public policy condemning petitioner's conduct--conduct which
was unintentional and had little or no inflationary effect.
7. As an alternate holding, the court found that this payment vas not a penalty at
all but rather vwas equivalent to recovery of property by a sovereign similar to reposses-
sion of abandoned property. Rossman v. Commissioner, 175 F2d 711, 712 (1949).
8. 320 U.S. 467 (1943), 57 HtAv. L. REv. 109, 42 Mica. L. RIv. 1143 (1944).
9. This policy is effectuated in two ways: (1) by revocation of mailing privileges
through returning to the defrauder all proscribed postal matter stamped "Fraudulent' and
by returning all money orders to the remitters. 17 STAT. 322 (1872), as amended, 39
U.S.C. §259 (1946) ; 17 STAT. 323 (1872), as amended, 39 U.S.C. §732 (1946) ; and (2)
by the imposition of fines or imprisonment. 17 STAT. 323 (1872), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 338 (1946). In this case only the former enforcement procedure vms used; so no penal
deterrent was involved.
10. In so doing the court disavowed a contrary interpretation by the fifth circuit in
Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 143 F2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945). The fifth circuit interpreted the Heininger decision as
allowing the deduction of all legal expenses incurred contesting the government's anti-
trust claim. But it refused deduction of penalty payments or settlements. Id. at 277, 278.
This holding seems the more probably correct interpretation of the Heininger opin-
ion, which states that penalties are not deductible. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 473. Moreover, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has consistently followed this in-
terpretation. G.C.M. 24810, 1946-1 Cur. Buu.. 55 (legal expenses in OPA suit);
Greene Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 314 (1945), acq., 1945 Cu. BumTz 3 (legal
expenses contesting penalty for tax deficiencies); G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cu. BunL. 93
(legal expenses in antitrust suit).
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Price Control Act would not hamper the fight to control inflation."1  Since
the official policy of OPA was to settle for the overcharge only if the seller
had acted in good faith and had taken all practicable precautions,12 the court
felt that under these circumstances payment of the overcharge would never
be significant in overall enforcement strategy.
By relating deductibility -of a "penalty"'13 to the problem of law enforce-
ment, the second circuit has shown a commendable imagination which other
courts would do well to emulate. Equally commendable is the court's implicit
elimination of'the other arbitrary rule that damage payments to private per-
sons are always deductible. 14 A distinction based on whether payments are
made to private parties or public agencies has no relation to the policy of
strengthening regulatory legislation. Substantial damage payments to private
persons will frequently have the same deterrent effect as penalty payments
to the government.' 5 Payment of treble damages to consumers when price
violations occur in retail trade, for example, should not be treated differently
from payment to the government for the same misconduct when the Admin-
istrator has assumed the cause of action on behalf of the United States,10
11. See statutory statement of purposes, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. §901(a)
(1946). See also Ssx. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong, 2nd Sess. 21 (1942): "of all the con-
sequences of war, except human slaughter, inflation is the most destructive."
12. The official policy after June 30, 1944 appears in OPA Manual 9-1601.02. The
court here relied on a letter from Chester Bowles to Senator Wagner in April 1944 to
indicate that this was also the approved policy in 1943 at the time of the Rossman settle-
ment.
13. "The words 'penal' and 'penalty' have many different shades of meaning, and are
in fact among the most elastic terms known to the law." Ward v. Rice, 29 F. Supp. 714,
715 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
The functional approach suggested by the court here is much more fruitful than re-
liance on mere semantics. In evaluating the place of a sanction in administering the
policy of a regulation some classes of sanctions, such as parking fines, previously labeled
penal, see note 3 supra, may appear too insignificant to warrant refusal of tax deduction
while others considered remedial have a substantial deterrent effect and should remain
taxable.
14. The implication is stronger when coupled with the earlier expression of disap-
proval of this unreasonable distinction by the second circuit in National Outdoor Adver-
tising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (1937).
15. This is particularly impbrtant where enforcement by means of monetary sanc-
tion is implemented predominantly by private damage suits-as in the Fair Labor Stand.
ards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1946), where, except for the rarely
invoked criminal sanction for willful violation, penal enforcement takes the form of double
damage suits by injured employees. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C, §216 (1946). This
enforcement procedure under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a particularly strong de-
terrent weapon because employees can band together in class suits and thus conimand
substantial damages. P-H WAo HouR SERv. U1 11,035-11,041.4 (1950).
16. This distinction is made by the Internal Revenue Bureau in I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum.
BULL. 111.
Before 1944 the Administrator had no right of action against retail sellers; con-
sequently deductions were allowed for those few voluntary payments to the government
of the overcharge amount. I.T. 3630, 1943 Cum. BuL. 113. In 1944, however, the
Administrator was empowered to institute a claim on behalf of the United States if the
injured buyers failed to press charges within thirty days. 58 STAT. 640 (1944), 50 U.S.C.
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Similarly, in the enforcement of wage and hour laws, guilty employers should
not be allowed deductions merely because the damages go to the employees.'7
Unfortunately, the court in the Rossian case failed to make a realistic
application of its new rule.' 8 The magnitude of the enforcement problem
under statutes regulating business behavior makes it virtually impossible to
uncover more than a small percentage of violations. 19 The problem is par-
ticularly acute where, as in the Price Control Act, there is a short statute of
limitations20 and where involved and prolonged investigations usually precede
prosecution.2 1 In this situation, agencies tend to select - for investigation and
§ 925(e) (1946), amending 56 STAT. 33 (1942). Thenceforward all payments to the
United States were to extinguish the Administrator's cause of action, and tax deductibil-
ity depended solely upon whether the damages were paid to the government or to con-
sumers.
17. The purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act was to insure working men and
women a fair day's pay. See Walling v. Snyder Min. Co., 65 F. Supp. 725, 731 (D. Minn.
1946). Since this policy is implemented primarily by private damage suits, see note 15
supra, enforcement would be far more effective if the deterrent effect of double damage
judgments were not diminished by subsequent allowance of tax deductions.
The Internal Revenue Bureau has allowed deduction of these damages. I.T. 376,
1945 Cum. BuLi. 95. See note 4 supra.
18. The government brief relied on the line of cases which had ruled that the im-
position of a penalty was an automatic mandate for denial of deduction. Consequently
practical considerations relating to enforcement of regulatory statutes were not presented
to the court.
19. The number of OPA investigators never exceeded 3500--approximately one per
county. Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1039 n.67. In 1944 OPA had to administer 502
regulations affecting three million different business establishments. The staff wras so
inadequate that most businesses were not even investigated. Memorandum to OPA Re-
gional Administrators from Chester Bowles, May 24, 1944. Prosecution by injured
purchasers was at best haphazard because of indifference, collusion or fear of economic re-
prisals. 10 OPA Q. REP. 62 (1944). Moreover, the complexity of the regulations fre-
quently made it extremely difficult to educate potential complainants in detecting viola-
tions. Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1039.
For recognition of inadequacy of investigating personnel in the Wage and Hour
Division see Fleming y. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627, 630 (D. lid. 1940).
20. 56 STAT. 34 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §925(e) (1946); OPA Kv uAL
9-1600.07.
21. "Suits for treble damages generally involved even more exhaustive investigations
than were necessary in the application of other types of sanctions. The reason for this was
that in treble damage cases it was necessary to prove a large number of different trans-
actions in order to make the amount of recovery sufficient to operate as an effective deter-
rent... Investigations were often, but not always, made an appreciable time after the
violation had occurred. Of course, it was not possible to determine until after a pre-
liminary investigation had been made, whether or not a violation had occurred and, if so,
what type of sanction should be applied. In treble damage cases a further investigation
was normally made before filing suit, and this latter, more intensive investigation would
consequently often take place a considerable time after the violations had occurred." Com-
munication to YAlz LAw JouxAL from Thomas I. Emerson, formerly Deputy Admin-
istrator for Enforcement, OPA, and Fleming James, Jr., formerly Deputy Administrator
for Litigation, OPA, Dec. 8, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
22. "Proper selection of cases is the key to effective enforcement. We do not want
to and cannot police every transaction or even handle every violation that occurs. A really
19M0
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prosecution those cases most likely to have a maximum deterrent effect on
subsequent violations."
Any rule which reduces the ultimate cost of non-compliance will tend to de-
feat the deterrent purpose of selective enforcement.2 4 To permit the deduction
of a penalty merely because the violator didn't mean to do it would hardly
encourage positive steps to comply.2 5 But the effect of a standing rule,
adopted in the Rossnman case, that a deduction will be permitted on an addi-
tional showing of "due care" is less certain. Probably most businessmen
would consider "due care" as an "out" rather easy to meet, and would have
little incentive to take extensive precautions if a tax deduction were so readily
available. On the other hand, businessmen will not necessarily make addi-
tional efforts to comply merely because a tax deduction is forbidden. Exten-
sive precautions cost money, and if "due care" were no ground for deducti-
bility some individuals might decide to skip the precautions and take the chance
that they would not be discovered. Given this uncertainty, a court might rea-
sonably yield to its sympathy for a poor soul confused by the maze of federal
regulations 20 and allow a tax deduction as recompense for his diligence.
Even if sympathy for the "innocent" transgressor is well-founded, how-
ever, there are other reasons for not letting it govern deductibility. Settle-
effective enforcement program--as distinguished from haphazard and ineffectual flounder-
ing in the enforcement field-starts with the careful and intelligent selection of cases."
Memorandum to OPA Regional Administrators from Chester Bowles, Jan. 31, 1945.
23. See Schwench, The Administrative Crirne, Its Creation and Punishnient by
Administrative Agencies, 42 MIcH. L. Ray. 51, 85 (1943); GELLnO1RN, ADMIiNISTRATIVE
LAw, CASES AND COMMENTS 327-39 (2d ed. 1947).
24. If the tax were 100%, the effect of allowing the deduction would be to relieve the
taxpayer of the entire burden of the sanction, and the same is true pro tanto where the
rate is lower. Since OPA penalties were levied in times of high profits and propor-
tionately even higher corporate taxation, the burden of the penalty would have been
relatively minimal if deductions were granted. See particularly the Excess Profits Tax,
54 STAT. 975 (1940), as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 710-83 (1940), repealed, 59 STrA. 568
(1945). Moreover, complex regulations, coming usually in wartime, generally are ac-
companied by high taxes. Particularly under these conditions would the tax leniency
here suggested hamper effective penal enforcement.
Even in normal times, when the maximum corporate income tax is 38%, INT. Ray.
CODE §§ 13(b) (1) and 15(b) (3), allowance of deductions would materially lessen the
deterrent effect of the sanction on tax-wise businessmen.
25. "Violations arising out of carelessness or indifference may well be more im-
portant in some situations than wilful violations." Memorandum to OPA Regional Ad-
ministrators from Chester Bowles, Jan. 31, 1945.
It is for this reason as well as for administrative convenience that absolute liability
is often imposed for violation of regulatory acts. See, e.g., Fontes v. Porter, 156 F.2d
956 (9th Cir. 1946) (good faith and due care no defense to price violation); Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) (reasonable care no defense under
Safety Appliance Acts). See, for further examples, Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
CoL L. REv. 55, 87 (1933).
26. Rossman v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1949).
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ment by an agency does not necessarily mean that the violation was unavoid-
able.2 7 Proof of bad faith or of want of due care is always difficult because
the evidence is peculiarly available to the defendant.2 And even though the
agency might require detailed proof of good faith and due care before settle-
ment for the amount of the overcharge, thus putting the burden on the de-
fendant, normally agencies such as OPA have neither sufficient time nor per-
sonnel to investigate and challenge doubtful defenses of this kind without dis-
sipating too much of their enforcement potential on one offender. OPA field
officers settled a disproportionately large number of cases-over 707%-for the
amount of the overcharge despite doubt concerning the sufficiency of the
violator's attempts to comply.29 If settlement cases were to have the tax
significance here adopted by the court, and if agencies could not otherwise
convince the courts of the undesirability of these deductions, they would be
compelled to prosecute to judgment all penalty claims where allowance of a
deduction would hinder effective enforcement. As a result, either the scope
of regulatory coverage would be drastically curtailed or the costs of adminis-
tration appreciably increased.
27. The facts of the Rossman case were peculiarly favorable to the taxpayer in that
Mr. Rossman's voluntary disclosure of his company's violation and his express willing-
ness to rectify the mistake in any way possible were certainly acts of "good citizenship."
Rossman v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 468, 474-6 (1948). The equities favoring defendant
Rossman are more fully spelled out in Gelfand, Payments to OPA, 27 TAXES 961 (1949).
But Rossman, himself, had participated in preparing the regulations which his company
violated, Rossman v. Commissioner, supra, at 470, so that he could less justifiably claim
confusion caused by complexity of the regulations. The Tax Court, indeed, found that
"it is not too clear from the evidence that the overcharges might not have been avoided
if the petitioner had adopted more appropriate accounting measures." Id. at 472. It is
also noteworthy that the "unavoidable!' violations which occasioned an amicus brief in-
volved overcharges of over two million dollars. Brief for Pacific Mills as amicus curiae,
Rossman v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
28. The duty of businessmen to take all practicable precautions was defined very
strictly by OPA. For example, "Where violations [were] committed by employees, this
[standard of care was] not met by the employer unless he took every practicable step to:
(1) Select and instruct employees, (2) install a system for their guidance, (3) ched
up on the operation of this system and to detect and report violations, and (4) discipline
and, where indicated, discharge employees who violated." OPA MA.TAx. 9-1601.04.
The difficulties of checking on compliance with such requirements are apparent.
29. Over 70% of the Administrator's suits for treble damages were settled for the
overcharge or less. OPA Enforcement Charts, Series A, Chart VIII (1945). This en-
forcement laxity was criticized by the Deputy Administer for Enforcement. Memorandum
to OPA Field Officers from Thomas I. Emerson, March 19, 1945. But "the enormous
volume of work and the need for concentrating on the most significant cases compelled
settlement of cases at single the amount of the overcharge even though the investigation
did not disclose the requisite good faith and precautions. The policy in the various offices
differed somewhat in this matter. But all offices were forced to be more lenient than the
official instructions required because of the pressure of work." Communication from
Thomas I. Emerson and Fleming James, Jr., supra note 21.
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Similarly, voluntary disclosure-of violations in no way proves that the of.
fender took all practicable precautions.8 0 Discovery of infractions by the
violator himself may indicate instead that diligent compliance measures would
have prevented their occurence. Nor does voluntary disclosure necessarily
mean good faith. The violator may have confessed his sin only because he
anticipated prosecution and hoped to get a settlement for less than the full
statutory penalty. 31 Although preferential tax treatment, by encouraging
voluntary reports, would lighten the enforcement load of an agency, volun-
tary payment of penalties for illegal acts is not the kind of compliance sought.
Agencies are not interested in locking the stable after the horse has been
stolen. 32 They are primarily interested in seeing to it that illegal acts are not
committed in the first place.
A mechanical distinction between private damages and public penalties is a
poor guide to their deductibility for tax purposes and is ripe for discard. But
the new rule proposed in the Rossman case should not be used to extend de-
ductibility.3 3 Instead, it should become the basis for denying deductions for
any money sanction designated by the appropriate administrative agency to
be a substantial deterrent, whether payable to private persons or the gov-
ernment. Since the agency is most familiar with practical enforcement prob-
lems, it is in the best position to determine how important a particular sanc-
tion may be. Moreover, once the classification has been made, the burden of
relitigating good faith and due care issues in tax actions would be removed.
This may be harsh for those who have tried hard to avoid violations, but in-
dividual hardship is often outweighed by the importance of effectively en-
forcing regulations passed for the general welfare.
30. The element of voluntary disclosure was not considered significant by the court
in the Rossinan case.
31. Leniency by the agency would seem adequate incentive for the cooperative busi-
nessman. Moreover the agency is in the best position to judge whether the disclosure Is
in complete good faith and, therefore, to determine the appropriate reward for voluntary
disclosure in each individual case.
32. For example, in the instant case the inflationary effect of the overcharge had al-
ready been irrevocably injected into the economy, having been reflected in the prices of
all wholesalers and manufacturers who purchased from the Rossman Company.
33. The handicaps to enforcement which result from allowance of penalty deductions
might conceivably be eliminated either by agency concentration on non-deductible criminal
fines or by statutory augmentation of penalty amounts to compensate for tax deduction.
But criminal sanctions are generally available only against the willful offender. E.g.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1946), and Price
Control Act, 56 STAT. 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. 925(b) (1946). Careless vio-
lations, which are far more numerous and possibly of equal importance, would remain
unchecked. An overall compensating increase in the amounts of the penalties would be
undesirable because it would make the effective penal burden dependent on the violator's
income tax bracket.
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